ABSTRACT: This paper presents damage of bridges during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake. Since the bridges in the north Miyagi-ken and south Iwate-ken suffered extensive damage in the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake, damage of bridges in the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake is evaluated in comparison with the damage in the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake so that effect of the recent progress of seismic design can be evaluated. Tsunami-induced damage was extensive for bridges along the Pacific Coast. Typical feature of tsunami-induced damage is presented based on a field investigation and video movies.
INTRODUCTION
The Great East Japan earthquake (M w 9.0) occurred at 14:46 (local time) on March 11, 2011 along the Japan Trough in the Pacific Ocean. The fault zone extended 450km and 200km in the north-south and west-east directions, respectively. Extensive damage occurred in a wide region in the east Japan.
As shown later the seismic design code of bridges was extensively enhanced since 1990. Among a number of bridges which suffered damage during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, the bridges in the north Miyagi-ken and south Iwate-ken suffered extensive damage during the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake (for example, EERI 1978) . Thus, the Great East Japan earthquake was a valuable opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of recent progress of seismic design codes by comparing damage during two earthquakes. Damage of bridges is shown here for two categories: bridges which were designed in accordance with the pre-1990 design codes and the post-1990 design codes. Effect of the seismic retrofit is also presented.
It was the first time to have extensive damage to bridges by tsunami in recent years. No single word about tsunami was included in the design codes issued prior to 2002. Of course, extensive damage occurred due to tsunami in the past, but it was regarded as unavoidable natural disasters before the World War II. After the World War II, there were tsunami earthquakes, but extensive damage did not occur to transportation facilities. This paper presents ground-motion-induced damage and tsunami-induced damage of bridges with an emphasis on road bridges in the north Miyagi-ken and south Iwate-ken (refer to Fig. 1 ) during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake.
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BRIEF HISTORY OF JAPANESE SEISMIC DESIGN FOR BRIDGES
For evaluating damage of bridges, it is important to note what design codes were used for constructing the bridges which suffered damage. History of Japanese seismic design of bridges since the end of 19 century may be classified into the following four stages.
Stage I
The Stage I corresponds to the days between Meiji Revolution and the end of Second World War II during which seismic design was not considered or was poorly considered. It was the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake when Japanese first realized that technologies imported from the European countries and USA were insufficient for mitigating damage of structures due to an earthquake. Obviously the technologies imported from the European countries and USA did not include any considerations for the seismic effects. The Great Kanto earthquake was a starting point for Japanese to develop our own seismic design practice. At the Stage I, damage always resulted from settlement, overturning and excessive drift of foundations. Countermeasure for damage and cost saving for the use of expensive steel rebars led to the practice of constructing large and stiff foundations and piers, and this concept became the main stream of seismic design of bridges in Japan.
Stage II
The Stage II corresponds to the days of the 1960s. Extensive damage of bridges occurred due to liquefaction during the 1964 Niigata earthquake. A terminology of "liquefaction" came after the -321 -Niigata earthquake leading to extensive research for the mechanism of liquefaction. The original concept of "unseating prevention devices" was proposed by Japanese field engineers. They proposed that if adjacent decks were tied together by cables or if a deck was connected to a substructure, a total collapse of bridges could be prevented. This concept was incorporated in the 1971 Design guidelines for seismic design of bridges (JRA 1971) first in the world. Now it is widely adopted not only in Japan but also worldwide. Currently there are essentially no bridges in Japan which are not equipped with unseating prevention devices. Various unseating prevention devices are currently implemented.
Stage III
After the Stages I and II, foundations and piers were strengthened, the effect of soil liquefaction was included in seismic design, and unseating prevention devices were implemented. As a consequence, although the existing damage was mitigated, damage extended in an unexpected direction. The days between 1978 and 1995 when we had extensive damage to reinforced concrete piers and steel bearings corresponds to Stage III.
During the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake (M JMA 7.4), extensive damage concentrated to piers and bearings though damage of foundations due to excessive displacement and liquefaction was mitigated. In the 1982 Urakawa-oki earthquake, extensive shear failure occurred at Shizunai Bridge at cut-off of main reinforcements with insufficient development. Obviously damage shifted from the past weak links to the new weak links. Though the allowable shear strength of concrete was overestimated and the development of longitudinal bars at cut-off points was insufficient, the overestimation of concrete shear strength and insufficient cut-off did not lead to shear failure of piers in the Stages I and II since the concrete section was sufficiently large. However as the population in cities increased, a space limitation under bridges restricted the size of piers in viaducts. The same restriction was imposed to river bridges for smoother river flow. Thus, column and pier sections had to be reduced in size such that they became flexible piers. Under such a condition, the overestimation of the concrete shear capacity and insufficient development at cut-off predominantly contributed to resulting in shear failure in columns and piers.
Steel bearings which accommodated only limited relative displacement between superstructures and substructures suffered extensive damage. Side blocks with poor capacity always sheared off, and anchor bolts pulled out from concrete bases in past earthquakes. Because only an elastic static analysis based on a 0.15-0.3g elastic static seismic force was used, the seismic force demand for steel bearings was inadequate. There was an argument whether weak steel bearings were a fuse to limit an excessive transfer of the inertia force from superstructures to substructures such that collapse of substructures could be prevented. However damage of weak steel bearings often resulted in excessive drift of superstructures leading to damage of substructures, and repair of steel bearings required long down time once extensive damage occurred in a wide region.
The shift of damage to piers and bearings from foundations was first noticed in the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake and it extensively occurred during the 1995 Kobe earthquake.
Stage IV
The importance of considering the realistic design ground motions and ductility capacity by preventing shear failure for piers and columns was recognized since the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake. The first seismic design code which included the design requirement for ductility capacity was issued in 1990 as Part V Seismic design, Design specifications of highway bridges (JRA 1990 ). An inelastic static analysis as well as the Type I ground motions as shown in Fig. 2 was incorporated in the 1990 code, where the Type I ground motion represents the ground motions which are induced by an M8 subduction earthquake. In design, the deterministic ground motions which were possibly developed in Tokyo during the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake was used as the Type I ground motions. As well as the Type II ground motions which was incorporated in the 1995 Guide specifications (JRA 1995 ) and 1996 code (JRA 1996 , an introduction of realistically high intensity ground motions and an inelastic static analysis extensively enhanced the seismic performance of brides designed in -322 -accordance with the post-1990 codes. The days after the 1995 Kobe earthquake corresponds to the Stage IV.
Various research studies for seismic isolation were on going in parallel with the preparation of 1990 design code (TRCNLD 1988 , PWRI 1992 . The first seismic isolated bridge with use of lead rubber bearings (Miyagawa Bridge, Shizuoka-ken) and high damping rubber bearings (Yama-age Bridge, Tochigi-ken) were constructed in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Implementation of elastomeric bearings, LRB and HDB was initiated in the early 1990s (Unjoh et al. 2010) . Those bearings were implemented not only in seismic isolated bridges but also in multi-span continuous bridges for distribution of the inertia force to every substructures. The implementation of elastomeric bearings, LRB and HDR extensively mitigated damage resulted from steel bearings during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake.
Furthermore, a new evaluation analysis for the inertia force for multi-span continuous bridges was incorporated in the 1990 code. Prior to the 1990 code, the lateral force was simply evaluated by multiplying a reaction force and a seismic coefficient by disregarding the overall system response. In the 1996 Part V Seismic design (JRA 1996) , the Type II ground motions, which represents typical near-field ground motions induced by an M7 event (ground motions developed during the 1995 earthquake), an evaluation for residual displacement (Kawashima, MacRae, Hoshikuma, Nagaya 1998) , and an enhancement for lateral force demand for bearings and unseating prevention devices were incorporated (Kawashima 2000 , Kawashima 2006a ). Thus, the post-1990 design codes (1990 code and 1996 code) contributed to construction of bridges with enhanced seismic performance. As a consequence, ground-motion-induced-damage of bridges which were designed in accordance with the post-1990 codes was minor as will be described later. 3 shows the progress of seismic design of bridges in terms of number of pages of design codes which are related to seismic design. Of course only an increase of number of pages in codes does not necessarily lead to better seismic design, but it can be realized how the knowledge of seismic design was accumulated in the past. It should be noted that only a 3-4 page description was provided in the 1964 Design specifications of highway bridges, which was referred to in design of a large number of bridges. A number of bridges which collapsed or suffered extensive damage during the 1995 Kobe earthquake were constructed in accordance with the 1964 design code (JRA 1964) . A combination of a static elastic analysis and an allowable stress design approach (seismic coefficient method) was used until 1990 (pre-1990 codes) . The static elastic method is still used but a combination of an inelastic static analysis and the Type I and II design ground motions is the main -323 -stream in the post-1990 codes. It should be noted that elastic and inelastic dynamic response analyses are conducted on routine basis for bridges with complex structural response after 1995. Seismic retrofit of existing bridges was conducted for reinforced concrete piers which had cut-offs of longitudinal bars with insufficient development since the 1980s (Kawashima 2006b ). Over 30,000 piers were so far retrofitted since 1995. However there still remain a number of piers which require retrofitting. Moreover, seismic retrofit of foundations has been conducted for only few bridges.
GROUND MOTIONS AND DESIGN GROUND MOTIONS
A number of strong motion accelerations were recorded in the damaged areas by the National Institute of Earth Science and Disaster Prevention and Japan Meteorological Agency. Since most of them were recorded on stiff sites, they cannot be directly compared to the Type I and Type II ground motions. Fig.  4 shows some accelerations recorded along the Pacific Coast. Ground accelerations continued over 300s, and had at least two wave groups reflecting the fault rupture process. The highest peak ground acceleration was 27.0 m/s 2 which was recorded at Tsukidate City. However this high acceleration was resulted from a single pulse with high frequency components. The response acceleration at 1.0s period At soft soil sites in the north Sendai City such as Osaki City, Tome City, Wakuya City and Ichinoseki City, ground accelerations having higher response accelerations at 0.5-1.5s period range were recorded. In particular, the response acceleration was slightly over 16 m/s 2 at Osaki as shown in Fig. 6 . Thus it is considered that the response accelerations at high intensity areas during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake was close to but smaller than the Type II design ground motions.
DAMAGE DUE TO GROUND MOTIONS
Damage of bridges which were constructed in accordance with the pre-1990 codes Extensive damage occurred at the bridges which were designed in accordance with the pre-1990 design code and not yet retrofitted in accordance with the post-1990 design codes. For example, Photo 1 shows flexural-shear failure of reinforced concrete piers at Fuji Bridge. The damage was resulted from an overestimated shear capacity and an inadequate development of longitudinal bars at cut-off which were the common practice in the pre-1980 design codes. This mode of damage occurred extensively during the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake (Kawashima and Unjoh 1997) . Extensive investigation was directed to clarify the failure mechanism of such damage (for example, Kawashima, Unjoh and Hoshikuma 1995) , including a series of large scale shake table experiments using E-Defense ). It should be noted that damage progresses shortly once shear cracks were initiated under this failure mechanism. Seismic retrofit was initiated in the 1980s (Akimoto et al 1990) , and it was accelerated after the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Over 30,000 columns were so far retrofitted. Consequently, during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, damage due to this mechanism did not occur at the bridges which were retrofitted, while the damage still occurred at the bridges which were not yet retrofitted.
Yuriage Bridge (refer to Photo 2) suffered extensive damage at reinforced concrete hollow and solid columns, an end of prestressed concrete girders, and steel pin and roller bearings during the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake as shown in Photo 3(a). Since the damaged columns were repaired and retrofitted by reinforced concrete jacketing, they did not suffer damage again. However steel pin and roller bearings suffered extensive damage again in the similar mode as shown in Photo 3 (b). It is obvious that steel pin and roller bearings are vulnerable to seismic action, because the stress builds up An end of a lower truss brace with a gusset plate was completely disconnected due to corrosion. Because similar disconnection was observed at other lower braces, it is likely that a large torsion response of the truss bridge due to deterioration of torsional rigidity resulted in extensive rupture and buckling of upper and lower braces. This truss bridge was critical for collapse during the earthquake.
Performance of bridges which were retrofitted
Damage of bridges which were already retrofitted suffered virtually no damage. For example, Sendai Bridge which is an extremely important bridge in Sendai City suffered extensive damage at reinforced concrete piers and steel bearings as shown in Photo 7(a) during the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake. However this bridge suffered no damage during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, because columns were retrofitted as shown in Photo 7(b) and the original steel bearings were replaced with elastomeric bearings as shown in Photo 8. Shin-Iino-gawa Bridge which carries National Road 45 over Kitakami River suffered extensive damage at steel pin and roller bearings as shown in Photo 9 during the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake. It was retrofitted prior to the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake such that 1) several reinforced concrete piers were retrofitted by steel jacketing, 2) nonlinear viscous dampers were installed between a superstructure and a substructure, and 3) steel bearings were replaced with elastomeric beatings as shown in Photo 10. As a result, the bridge suffered no damage during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake. Elastomeric bearings generally performed quite well under the extreme ground motions as shown above. However it should be noticed that elastomeric bearings ruptured in some bridges. For example, several elastomeric bearings ruptured such that a deck offset by 0.5m in the transverse direction as shown in Photo 13(a) at Sendai-Tobu Viaduct. Rubber layers detached from steel plates in addition to rupture inside rubber layers as shown in Photo 13(b). Though detailing is not yet known, there may be two possible reasons for the damage. The first is an inappropriate design and fabrication of the elastomeric bearings. The second is an interaction between adjacent decks. Since an expansion joint must have constrained relative displacement between adjacent decks in the transverse direction, it is possible that a larger displacement demand of a deck is imposed to an adjacent deck resulting in larger shear deformation in the damaged bearings (Quan and Kawashima 2009). 
TSUNAMI INDUCED DAMAGE

Bridges which suffered damage by tsunami
A number of bridges suffered damage by tsunami. Overturning of substructures due to scouring did -330 -not occur in road bridges although it happened in railway bridges. Bridges which were built in the days prior to the Stage IV were generally vulnerable to tsunami effect since connection of spans to substructures was weak. Bridges which were taller than tsunami waves did not suffer damage. Many short bridges with short spans generally survived tsunami though they were completely covered by tsunami because tsunami wave did directly hit bridges and they were well constraint by abutments.
Back fills and embankment were eroded and lost at many bridges. Though repair of back fills and embankment was easier than repair of bridge structures, an appropriate protection should be considered in the future.
Utatsu bridge
Utatsu Bridge built in 1972 at Minami-sanriku Town over Irimae Bay suffered extensive damage by tsunami as shown in Photo 14. It was a 303m long 12 simply supported PC girder bridge consisting of 3 types of superstructures with spans ranging from 14.4m to 40.7m as shown in Fig. 7 . Diaphragms were set between PC T-beam girders at both ends and intermediate points. The concrete decks had an inclination as large as 6% in the transverse direction due to curved alignments of the bridge. For example, the inclination was 4.8%, 3%, 3%, 1.1% (sea side down) at spans S3, S4, S5, and S6, respectively, then it changed to 2-5%, 9%, 4% and 2% (sea side up) at spans S8, S9 & S10, S11, and S12, respectively.
The bridge was seismically retrofitted a few years ago. Columns were retrofitted by reinforced concrete jacketing and unseating prevention devices were installed. The spans S1, S2, S11 and S12 remained but spans S3-S10 were washed ashore. Spans S3-S7 were simply supported pre-tensioned PC T-beam girder bridges. As a part of the seismic retrofit, cable restrainers were set between S3-S7, and three steel stoppers were provided at the end of S3 and S7 for preventing excessive longitudinal deck movements. Though cable restrainers ruptured between S4 and S5, S3-S4 and S5-S6-S7 were still tied together after floated ashore as shown in Photo 15. S8, S9 and S10 laid down upside down as shown in Photo 16. Only P2 suffered flexural failure as shown on Photo 17(a) at the shore side. The column was retrofitted by reinforced concrete jacket. The damage was probably caused by ground motion induced seismic force since the moment capacity at the retrofitted section based on a fiber element analysis is much larger than the demand by an estimated tsunami-induced force. Since new ties in the jacket were flare welded, they were still effective to confine the column though they yielded. S2 did not suffer damage and three stoppers for S2 on P2 were intact. On the other hand, three stoppers for S3 on P2 suffered damage as shown in Photo 17(b), indicating that S3 offset when S3 was dragged due to tsunami.
Photo 18 (a) shows two steel longitudinal stoppers for S12 on Abutment 2. The main function of the stoppers was to prevent excessive deck displacement in the longitudinal direction, but they also restricted deck displacement in the transverse direction. Photo 18 (b) and (c) shows three stoppers and four pot bearings on P10. Three longitudinal stoppers did not suffer damage at all. All four upper bearings were detached from the lower bearings and remained at the end of S10. Three side stoppers in the sea side were removed due to rupture of four anchor bolts each. The sea most lower bearing slightly uplifted but other three lower bearings were in their original position without damage. From the fact that three stoppers neither suffered damage nor tilted, it was likely that S10 was uplifted higher than the top of three stoppers before floated.
Photo 15 Spans S5-S7
Photo 16 Overturned Span S8 Photo 18(d) shows three steel longitudinal stoppers and four seat extenders for S9 on P9, and Photo 18 (e) shows three stoppers for S8 on P7. The stoppers for S8 and S9 neither tilted nor suffered damage. This also indicates that S8 and S9 were first uplifted before they were floated. Photo 18 (f) shows four stoppers for S7 on P7. Two shore side stopper slightly tilted toward the shore side with other two stoppers being not damaged at all. It indicates that S7 (one of the shortest deck) was uplifted with an inclination toward the shore side before it was floated. Since the uplift of S7 at the shore side was insufficient, it hit the shore side stoppers resulting in a small tilting. Other shorter spans (S2-S6) were simply dragged laterally by tsunami.
A video taken at a slope near the north abutment A2 by a local resident shows a whole rising process of tsunami until the spans were completely covered by tsunami as shown in Photo 19. Since tsunami reached the top of a 6m tall pole shown at the center of the photo, it is estimated that the deck surface was saturated 6m deep. Since the spans failed after they were completely under water, it is not known when the spans were uplifted and floated. Since at both ends of the bay, tsunami flow was not as fast as the flow at the center, it is likely that this saved spans S1-S2 and S11-S12 from collapse. Tsunami flow velocity at the center of the bay was about 6m/s.
Damage of Utatsu Bridge may be summarized as shown in Fig. 8 (b) and (c). Failure mode of foundations due to scouring is also shown in Fig. 8 (a) , but this failure mode did not occur not only at Utatsu Bridge but also at other bridges except railway bridges as described earlier.
If spans uplift before floated under tsunami action, it may be effective to install restrainers in the vertical direction between girders and substructures so that bridge spans can be tied down to substructures. Such a tsunami unseating prevention device may be cheaper and effective as a countermeasure for tsunami. Since installation of tsunami unseating prevention devices imposes an additional upward force to substructures, substructures have to be strengthen if they do not have sufficient capacity. However because an uplifting force due to tsunami action may not reach several times the span weight, it is likely that strengthening of substructures is not required at most bridges except very old bridges.
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Bridges which survived tsunami
There are a number of bridges which survived tsunami although they were completely saturated by tsunami. For example, Yanoura Bridge that carried National Road 45 over Koshi River in Kamaishi City was a 108.6m long curved three span simply supported steel girder bridge as shown in Photo 20. Two abutments and two piers were supported by four pile foundations with ten 30m long and 1m diameter cast in place reinforced concrete piles. A video was taken at Kamaishi Port Office, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation, located at the left bank 140m from the bridge as shown in Photo 21. A Toyota rent-a-car office and Ozawa Building were located near the bridge at the left and right bank, respectively. At about 15:00, the first tsunami reached the bridge as shown in Photo 22. The spans were already completely underwater. The water was nearly the top of an entrance gate of Toyota rent-a-car office and the mid-height of the second story of Ozawa Building, indicating that the deck surface was 5m underwater.
As shown from white center stripe in Photo 20, the spans did not drift in the transverse direction. The bridge suffered only minor damage on hand rails. The bridge remained open for use by emergency vehicles following the earthquake.
Two reasons may be pointed out for satisfactory performance of Yanoura Bridge against tsunami. The first is that since Yanoura bridge was of steel girder bridges, they had only steel channel braces at both ends and intermediate points which lead to no uplift force due to the trapped air under the decks (Chen 2007 ). The second is that few debris was included in tsunami propagating inside the river because the bridge was located the most downstream in the river though a large amount of wooden house originated debris was included in tsunami which propagated along both sides of the river. increases (S1-S2 and S8-S12). Thus it is considered possible that S8-S10 were uplifted before floated if some additional tsunami hydrodynamic force applied to the decks.
Similarly, the tsunami drag force and the lateral resistance were evaluated for bridge spans. The tsunami drag force df F was assumed to be evaluated from hydrodynamic water pressure based on the Design specifications of highway bridges (JRA 2002 , Kosa et al 2010 , Shoji et al 2009 
in which w  = g w w / is the mass density of tsunami water, w w is unit weight of tsunami water, g is the gravity acceleration, d c is drag coefficient, w v is tsunami velocity, and d A is the side area of a deck. The drag coefficient d c is assumed as 1.4 for a rectangular section based on the Design specifications of highway bridges (JRA 2002) . It should be noted that since Eq. (2) represents hydrodynamic force applying to a pier in a river flow, scattering of Eq. (2) must be large. The inclination of decks in the transverse direction was not included in analysis.
On the other hand, since the steel bearings were the most weak link connecting a bridge to the pier cap, the lateral resistance of a span was evaluated based on the design seismic lateral force of bearings in the transverse direction br F as
where h k is elastic seismic coefficient, d W is dead weight of a span and  is an over-strength factor for steel bearings. Since Utatsu Bridges was designed in accordance with the Pre-1990 design code, h k was assumed as 0.2 and the over-strength factor  was assumed to be 2.0.
Table 1(b) shows the tsunami drag force df F and the lateral resistance br F of a span evaluated for three types of girder section. Since the drag force df F is in proportion to the girder height, df F is close to the estimated lateral resistance of a span br F at S1-S2 and S8-S12. However at S3-S7 which were estimated to be dragged by tsunami based on the field damage investigation, df F is only 56% of br F . Thus, the failure of S3-S7 which were shortest among the three sections is difficult to predict not only from the lateral drag mechanism based on Eqs.( 2) and (3) but also from the floating mechanism based on Eq. (1). Further investigation is required. 
CONCLUSIONS
Ground-motion-induced and tsunami-induced damage of bridges in the north Miyagi-ken and south Iwate-ken during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake was studied. Based on the findings presented herein, the following conclusions may be deduced:
1) Ground-motion-induced damage of bridges which were built in accordance with the post-1990 design code was limited. Thus enhancing the shear and flexural capacity as well as ductility capacity of piers and extensive implementation of elastomeric bearings were effective for mitigating damage of bridges during this earthquake. Since the ground motions during the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake was nearly equal to or smaller than the Type II design ground motions, it is the anticipated seismic performance of bridges which were built based on the post-1990 design code. However effectiveness of the measures provided in the post-1990 design codes against stronger than code specified ground motions has to be further verified.
2) Bridges which were built in accordance with the pre-1990 codes and which were not yet retrofitted suffered similar damage developed during the 1978 Miyagi-ken-oki earthquake. Appropriate seismic retrofit is required for those bridges.
3) Tsunami-induced-damage was extensive to bridges along the Pacific Coast. There were at least two failure mechanisms; 1) simple drag in the transverse direction, and 2) spans uplift before floated. There were no road bridges which suffered damage by scoring. On the other hand, there were a number of bridges which survived tsunami action though they were completely underwater.
